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Baker: Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 20

John Baker*

These Remarks are a wonderful example of what Justice Thomas
was referring to when he said that this society is foremost in promoting
non-ideological exchange. The problem, however, is that it makes for
boring television.
How can we connect this non-ideological exchange with what is on
television? I would like to attempt to make this connection by beginning
with a reference to my twenty-one-year-old son. He is a faithful fan,
some would say a fanatical fan, of Rush Limbaugh and Bill O'Reilly.
And therefore, he knows exactly how to solve the immigration mess. He
says we should fence the border, then round up all the illegal immigrants
and send them back to their home country. After this, they may get in
line and come back legally if they choose. He believes that is a very
simple solution to illegal immigration.
We agree on the basic principles. That is, I agree on securing the
border. But for me, it is not only about the border. It is a question of
United States sovereignty, terrorism, and our relationship to the rest of
the world. My son and I agree that all immigration ought to be according
to law. That is the only kind of immigration we need. In relating
immigration to the rule of law, however, it is often forgotten that the rule
of law also includes issues of separation of powers and federalism. Thus,
it seems to me that we must ask ourselves about the means to the end of
curtailing illegal immigration. We agree on an end, but what are the
legal and constitutional issues regarding the means? Such questions
rarely get discussed on television.
This Remark discusses what I see wrong with the simple solution
and how we might approach illegal immigration in ways that are both
more effective and more consistent with the Constitution. The federal
government may be able to fence the border if the voters want that to be
done. However, there are a number of obstacles to consider. First,
* John Baker is the Dale Bennett Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; B.A.,
University of Dallas, 1969; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1972; Ph.D., University of
London, 2003.
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fencing the borders is going to take a long time.' And second, there is a
lot of evidence to the effect that some of the past efforts with fences
along the border have only compounded the problem. 2 As briefly
mentioned in Professor Neuman's Remark, some of the government's
"get tough" policies have actually exacerbated the problem. Most
notably, the 1996 reforms motivated illegal immigrants to stay in the
United States, rather than voluntarily returning to their own country.3
According to immigration lawyers, illegal immigrants went home
because they learned from their lawyers that, by doing so, they would be
able to return legally.
The fundamental problem with immigration policy since the 1996
legislation is that it imposes bars to legal reentry against those who have
come here illegally. There is a three-year bar, a ten-year bar, and a
permanent bar.4 So this whole notion that we can solve the problem by
getting illegals to go back to their country, stand in line, and come back
legally is simply based on a false premise. It is not possible to do that
under current law without some kind of waiver.
As for a roundup, Homeland Security-contrary to popular
impressions-has increased enforcement, especially during the last six
monthsf Round-ups have focused particularly on businesses.6 However,
Homeland Security has realized that they do not have the resources to do
all that is needed. This is why there has been an emphasis, as discussed
by Professor Kobach, on getting state law enforcement involved.7 But
we have to face the facts. The Department of Justice simply is not taking
cases at the same rate that they are being filed. Part of the issue may be
that the Department of Justice has brought some bad cases. Part of the
enforcement problem may also be that United States attorneys do not
completely take direction from Washington. Many in Congress do not
think that United States attorneys should be directed by the White House
1. See GORDON H. HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 30 (2007).
2. See Gerald L. Neuman, Remark, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule
of Law, 2007 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1335,
1336 (2008); see also HANSON, supra note 1, at 34.
3. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 1336.
4. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1996)).
5. Adam Nossiter, Hundreds of Factory Workers Are Held in Immigration Raid, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008, at A12.
6. Id.
7. See Kris W. Kobach, Remark, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of
Law, 2007 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 1323,
1328 (2008).
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or even the Attorney General as to which cases that they should
prosecute. 8 We thus have a problem of establishing a consistent
approach to enforcement internally within this Administration.
As for the states, Professor Kobach has written about the power of
states to enforce immigration laws, or to do so at least under certain
circumstances. 9 This is a complex problem. I would like to point out two
things. First, the federal government, under the Printz case, cannot force
the states to enforce federal laws. 10 That is to say, Congress and the
Executive lack the constitutional power to co-opt states into carrying out
federal policy.' That is a separate question from the clear principle that
states are bound by the Constitution, federal laws pursuant to the
Constitution, and Supreme Court interpretations of both. But in terms of
co-opting state agencies and executive agencies, Printz pretty much rules
out making the states enforce federal immigration laws.' 2 Second, there
are also limits on what states can do with respect to immigration when
they are not authorized by the federal government to act.
We can relate this back to the "Passenger Cases" in 1849.'3 While
there are certain areas that bump up against immigration where the states
are able to act under the police power, there are limits to what states can
do in terms of discouraging immigration. 14 Indeed, New York and
Massachusetts attempted in the nineteenth century to keep out Irish
immigrants. '5 They ultimately failed because immigration is a matter
involving our national borders and, therefore, committed to the federal
government, not the state government.16 The problem of immigration
ultimately is the responsibility of Congress. That, however, does not
mean that the Executive branch should fail to enforce existing law.

8. See Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Senators Chastise Gonzales at Hearing, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2007, at A4. Some Senators argued that United States attorneys were fired for not following
instructions from GOP officials that they should concentrate their efforts on certain crimes such as
voter fraud. Id.
9. See generally Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent
Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005) (discussing that
there is inherent authority for states to enforce federal immigration laws and Congress has not
preempted such state enforcement).
10. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal
government does not have the authority to direct state officials to carry out federal programs).
II. Id.at 933.
12. Id. at 935.
13. See generally The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (holding that states do not have
the constitutional power to tax aliens entering at the ports of those respective states).
14. Id. at 425-26.
15. See id. at 284-85.
16. Id. at 442-43.
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Indeed, the solution, it seems to me, is enforcement first, but not for the
reasons usually given.
What do I mean by this? First of all, the President's primary job,
under separation of powers, is to execute the laws.1 7 While he can
certainly seek to change the law, he is supposed to enforce the law as it
exists until it is changed. But there is another reason why the President
ought to enforce the immigration laws, and to do so vigorously.
Enforcing any law will expose unanticipated problems. Many of the
opposing opinions about immigration are based on conjecture about
what will happen if the existing laws are well enforced. The effects of
enforcement will differ in various areas of the country. Moreover, there
are likely to be different opinions around this country about whether
those effects are desirable or not. Attitudes toward legal, as well as
illegal, immigration are certainly affected by who bears the costs and
who benefits from immigration. In many communities, it may be that
citizens want to get rid of all workers from outside of the country. Doing
so may or may not result in increased employment for Americans. We
cannot really know except by enforcing the law. As an aside, we who
lived through Katrina do know that not a single roof in Louisiana or
Mississippi would have been replaced after the hurricane if the federal
government had not suspended immigration enforcement in the affected
area.
We live in a federal system. As per Federalist 10, people have many
different views on most matters of policy1 8 The place to resolve
conflicts among those views is in Congress. As a result, most matters of
policy require compromise in order to enact legislation. Of course,
Congress does not want to tackle immigration issues in this spirit. If,
however, the President enforces existing law and it proves to be
economically damaging enough, his action would force Congress to
meet its obligation by reaching an agreement to make some changes in
the law.
While I support vigorous enforcement against illegal immigration, I
am also concerned about the creeping jurisdiction of Homeland Security
away from the borders. Thanks to Congress and, largely, the
Republicans, the country has, since the 1970s, taken a tough "law and
order" approach at the federal level on matters that properly belong to

17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the problems and dangers that
faction poses to a republican government).
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the states.' 9 Thirty years later, people have realized how federalized
much of the crime in this country has become. If you consider the
creeping jurisdiction of Homeland Security-not only into critical
infrastructure, but into places such as meatpacking plants-you realize
that we are stretching the "war on terrorism" internally to the point of
militarizing law enforcement. 2 °
Now, just as I think that the Left is wrong to judicialize war, 21 it is
wrong to centralize and militarize law enforcement. Why? Under our
Constitution, we are not a unitary state like France.22 Not everything can
or should be solved by the federal government. Apart from the
fundamental constitutional objection, the federal government simply
cannot take over all law enforcement unless the number of federal law
enforcement agents and the number of federal judges increase to a size
equal to the total of police officers and judges in the fifty states. As it is,
the federal government cannot handle its responsibilities to United
States. The federal failure to enforce immigration law effectively ought
not to be the basis for creating a completely monolithic state. That is not
the view of liberty given to us by our founders.

19. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998),
available at www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/overcriminalization/$file/fedcrimlaw2.pdf (last
visited Sept. 24, 2008).
20. HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 27-29
(2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat-strathomelandsecurity.2007.pdf.
21. See generally John S. Baker, Jr., Competing Paradigms of ConstitutionalPower in 'The
War on Terrorism,' 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2005).
22. See 1958 CONST. 20.
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